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INTRODUCTION
In a recent essay in the Wake Forest Law Review,' Professor Sandy
Levinson argued that the venerable Marbury v. Madison2 should not
be taught as part of the foundational constitutional law course re-
quired at most law schools. He even said that he spends "no class
time on the opinion."4 In light of Marbury's central place in the con-
stitutional law canon, both in the classroom and the courtroom, this
is a controversial position to espouse, perhaps even "heretical."
Professor Levinson is a nationally recognized legal scholar who
has published numerous articles and books (including a well-
respected and widely-used constitutional law casebook).' I am a huge
fan and agree with much of what he has written in his long career. As
to the teaching of Marbuy, however, I believe he is mistaken.6 John
Marshall's decision is a classic that should be treated by courts and
academics as an important building block for modern constitutional
law. Not only should Marbury be taught to law students, it should be
the first constitutional case to which they are exposed.
Part I provides a brief introduction to the issues discussed in Mar-
bury, and some of the reasons students should read and analyze the
* Professor of Law, Georgia State College of Law. I would like to thank Neil Kinkopf, Sandy
Levinson, Suzanna Sherry, Louise Weinberg, and Patrick Weisman for helpful comments on
this essay.
I Sanford Levinson, Why I Do Not Teach Marbury (Except to Eastern Europeans) and Why You
Shouldn't Either, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 553 (2003).
2 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
3 Levinson, supra note 1, at 554.
4 Id.; see, e.g., KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 3-13 (14th
ed. 2001) (discussing Marbury at the beginning of a casebook); cases cited infra notes 65-66 and
accompanying text (citing and discussing cases that rely on Marbury).
5 PAUL BREST, SANFORD LEVINSON, J.M. BALKIN, & AKHIL REED AMAR, PROCESSES OF
CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING (4th ed. 2000); see also Legal Scholarship Symposium: The
Scholarship of Sanford Levinson, 38 TULSA L. REV. 553 (2003).
Professor Levinson admitted in his article that he wanted to "convince" other professors
to stop teaching Marbury. Levinson, supra note 1, at 554. I hope to show that teaching Marbury
is more important than ever.
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opinion. Part II sets forth and responds to Professor Levinson's spe-
cific arguments against using Marbuty in class as well as his assessment
that Marbury's importance is overstated. Finally, Part III details why it
is more important than ever to teach Marbuy and includes a few ob-
servations about how Marbury fits in with the Realist critique of consti-
tutional law.
I. MARBURY
The background, facts, rationales, and holdings of Marbury are ex-
tensively discussed and critiqued in the literature and will not be
summarized here.7 The purpose of this section is to establish a prima
facie case for the teaching of Marbuiy, and to lay the foundation for
responding to Professor Levinson's specific arguments.
In Marbury, Chief Justice Marshall asked and purported to answer
some of the most fundamental questions about our form of govern-
ment and our Constitution. Among the issues he addressed were
whether the United States Supreme Court had the authority to order
the Executive Branch to abide by the law; whether the Court should
give effect to a statute that is inconsistent with the Constitution; and
what was the relationship between the rule of law and our constitu-
tional democracy."
Professor Levinson argues that some or all of these questions were
unnecessary to the decision in Marbury, and that Marshall's handling
of these issues was far from persuasive.9 Conceding those points for
the sake of argument, it is still the case that Marbury was the Court's
first extensive treatment of these difficult problems, and the analysis
is excellent fodder for classroom discussion. For example, the follow-
ing oft-cited paragraphs always resonate with my students:
The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every
individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an in-
jury. One of the first duties of government is to afford that protec-
tion ....
The government of the United States has been emphatically termed a
government of laws, and not of men. It will certainly cease to deserve this
high appellation, if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a
vested legal right. °
7 For a good and recent collection of articles, see Judicial Review: Blessing or Curse? Or Both?
A Symposium in Commemoration of the Bicentennial of Marbury v. Madison, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REv.
313 (2003).
8 See infra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
9 See infra notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
10 Marbuiy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 163.
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Though Marshall's claims in the paragraph may be exaggerated,
the rule of law does generally require remedies for violations of legal
rights. Moreover, when students study the political question doctrine
and the prudential aspects of the standing doctrine, and learn that
sometimes the Court denies injured individuals any legal redress, this
part of Marbuiy can be used to evaluate those decisions."
As to judicial review of legislative acts, Marshall said the following
in language that makes as much sense today as it did then:
The powers of the legislature are defined and limited; and that those lim-
its may not be mistaken or forgotten, the constitution is written. To what
purpose are powers limited, and to what purpose is limitation committed
to writing, if these limits may, at any time, be passed by those intended to
be restrained? The distinction between a government with limited and
unlimited powers is abolished, if those limits do not confine the persons
on whom they are imposed, and if acts prohibited and acts allowed, are
of equal obligation. It is a proposition too plain to be contested, that the
constitution controls any legislative act repugnant to it; or that the legis-
lature may alter the constitution by an ordinary act.
After discussing this paragraph in class, I ask the students what
important question Marshall left unanswered. Almost always, I get
the answer I am looking for: "Who decides?" Then, we turn to Mar-
shall's famous statement that, "[i] t is, emphatically, the province and
duty of the judicial department, to say what the law is. Those who
apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and in-
terpret that rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the courts must
decide on the operation of each.' '  As Daniel Farber pointed out in
the same Symposium where Professor Levinson's essay appeared, the
logic of this paragraph strongly supports the Court's exercise of judi-
cial review. 4 It also prompts class discussions about the wisdom of
appointed, life-tenured judges reviewing legislative and executive ac-
tion, the judges' lack of accountability, and eventually a debate over
how judges should perform their interpretive tasks. Those questions
are a good place to begin a discussion of the appropriate
relationships between the three branches of the federal government
11 See, e.g., Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993) (dismissing a case brought by a fed-
eral judge arguing that the Senate violated the Constitution by conducting an impeachment
hearing before a Senate committee instead of the entire Senate); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490
(1975) (finding that low-income plaintiffs did not have standing to challenge a local zoning
ordinance).
1 Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 176-77.
is Id. at 177.
14 See Daniel A. Farber, Judicial Review and its Alternatives: An American Tale, 38 WAKE FOREST
L. REv. 415, 420-21 (2003).
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and the Court's power to hold the government accountable under
the law.15
II. PROFESSOR LEVINSON'S ARGUMENTS
Professor Levinson divided his essay into four arguments support-
ing his position that Marbury should not be taught and is not a par-
ticularly important case outside of the specific historical context in
which it arose. I will quote each of his headings and discuss his ar-
guments in turn.
A. "Understanding the Importance of Marbury Requires a Depth of
Historical Knowledge that Almost None of Our Students Possess and
that We Do Not Have Time to Teach."
16
Professor Levinson argues that Marbury's importance is mostly his-
torical and "derives from its place in the remarkable four-year drama
surrounding the election of Thomas Jefferson and his displacement
of the Federalist hegemons who had viewed national leadership as
simply their prerogative." 7 This drama included, among many other
events, the deadlocked presidential election of 1801, the details of
how the House of Representatives eventually selected Jefferson, the
political battles between the federalists and the anti-federalists, the
congressional cancellation of the 1802 Term of the Supreme Court,
and the Louisiana Purchase.
8
Professor Levinson also argues that Marbury cannot be understood
without a detailed discussion of Stuart v. Laird,'9 which upheld the re-
peal of the hastily enacted Circuit Court Act which added numerous
judges to the federal bench at the end of John Adams' presidency.0
Without an understanding of these historical events, Professor Levin-
son argues, students cannot appreciate Marbuy and see the opinion
in its proper context. Because there isn't enough time to provide
students with this history, Marbury should not be taught at all.
Professor Levinson's argument would seem to apply to most of the
cases in the basic constitutional law course, and yet we, and Professor
Levinson, still teach those cases. For example, a true appreciation of
15 am on record as being hostile to judicial review in general, and Marbuy in particular. See
ErieJ. Segall, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 175, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 569 (1999). Nevertheless, I be-
lieve that Marbury's importance requires its teaching.
16 Levinson, supra note 1, at 554.
17 Id.
18 See id. at 554-55.
19 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299 (1803).
Levinson, supra note 1, at 557.
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Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer" would require a lengthy
grounding in the events of the Korean War, post-World War II poli-
tics, and President Truman's relationships with Congress and organ-
ized labor, among others. Few law professors have the time and
probably the knowledge to present that background, yet Steel Seizure is
included in virtually every constitutional law casebook, and is taught
by most professors. Similarly, the early First Amendment cases such
22 23as Schenck v. United States, and Debs v. United States, are much better
understood with a proper background in the American radicalism
movements at the time and World War I politics, but it is simply not
possible to cover that background in significant detail in class. Yet,
these cases are still taught.
It is unclear why Marbury requires more historical attention than
these cases.
The second problem with Professor Levinson's historical argu-
ment is that it is not too difficult to give Marbuy a proper context in a
reasonable amount of class time. Here is the story in a nutshell as I
present it at the beginning of class (we get into more detail as we dis-
cuss the opinion):
The Presidential election of 1801 ended up being between three men:
the incumbent federalist John Adams, the anti-federalist Thomas Jeffer-
son, and Aaron Burr. The federalists believed in a strong national gov-
ernment (according to the standards of the day), whereas the anti-
federalists believed more in state autonomy. Adams was soundly defeated
but there was an Electoral College gridlock between Jefferson and Burr
so the fate of the presidency was thrown to the House of Representatives,
who eventually chose Jefferson to be the next President. On February 27,
1801, less than a week before Jefferson was going to be sworn into office,
the outgoing federalist Congress authorized the appointment of forty-two
new judges for the District of Columbia. These were municipal, not fed-
eral judges. The Congress also passed legislation creating sixteen new
federal judges. On March 2, 1801, the second to last day of his presi-
dency, President Adams appointed the judges, most of whom, of course,
were federalists. The federalist Senate confirmed them the next day.
The person responsible for sealing and delivering the commissions was
Secretary of State John Marshall who also happened to be the ChiefJus-
tice of the United States Supreme Court, and a strong federalist. Many of
the commissions for the judgeships were delivered and finalized, but
some were not. One of the commissions that did not get delivered was
the one for William Marbury, who was to be a justice of the peace in the
District of Columbia. When Jefferson was sworn into office as President,
he directed his Secretary of State not to deliver the undelivered
21 343 U.S. 579 (1952) ("Steel Seizure") (preventing President Truman from seizing steel mills
during the Korean War).
22 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (upholding a conviction for distributing anti-war leaflets).
23 249 U.S. 211 (1919) (upholding a conviction for anti-war speech).
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commissions to the federalist judges, including Marbury. Eventually,
Marbury sued in the Supreme Court arguing that once Congress author-
ized his judgeship and the President appointed him, he was entitled to
become a judge and therefore James Madison (the current Secretary of
State) should be ordered by the Court to deliver the commission. This
lawsuit made Jefferson so angry that he ordered his attorneys not to say
anything at the oral argument. Some people believe this made Marshall
think that if he ruled against Jefferson, the President might refuse to
obey the Court order, which could lead to a constitutional crisis. More-
over, although both Jefferson and Marshall were from Virginia, they did
not get along and criticized each other openly. Also keep in mind that
afterJefferson took office, he convinced the new anti-federalist Congress
to abolish the terms of the Supreme Court that were to take place in June
and December of that year, and Congress repealed the law passed by the
previous Congress creating new federal judgeships. In addition, the anti-
federalist Congress had begun impeachment proceedings against some
federalist judges. It was against this backdrop of nasty, partisan politics,
as acrimonious as anything we have today, that the case came before the
Court in 1803.
It is unclear why students need a more detailed background than
the above to appreciate the historical significance of Marbury. Of
course the more context the better, but that is true for every constitu-
tional case. Professor Levinson does suggest that Marbury is impor-
tant more for its place in the historical events of the time than for its
"portentous and quotable maxims... that are denied not only by the
case at hand but also by much future constitutional history.
2 4
Whether a quote is "portentous" or compelling is a matter of subjec-
tive taste, but there is no denying that Marshall's comments about the
rule of law, judicial review, and judicial authority over the Executive,
have stood the test of time. In their constitutional law course, stu-
dents will learn that the Court has prevented the President from seiz-
25ing the steel mills during what he termed a national emergency,
overturned numerous federal laws aimed at making government
more efficient,26 and at times thwarted and at other times supported
both Congressional and Executive attempts to deal with national
economic problems. Though all of this would probably have oc-
curred with or without- Marbury, John Marshall's opinion sets forth
the basic rationales for a strong judiciary and provides students with
an excellent foundation to analyze the Court's modern exercise of
24 Levinson, supra note 1, at 555.
25 See Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
26 See, e.g., Clinton v. New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986);
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
27 See, e.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); A.L.A. Schechter Poul-
try Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1
(1895).
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judicial review. There is no reason to lose that foundation simply be-
cause of the rich historical context in which the case arose.
B. "If One Is Going to Spend Class Time Teaching Students About
American History, Do It About Something That Is Truly Important. ""
Professor Levinson starts this part of his essay with what he be-
lieves to be a shared assumption about Marbury. He says that "I take it
that everyone agrees that the substantive legal topic of Marbury-i.e.,
the ability of Congress to add to the original jurisdiction of the Su-
preme Court-is of no real significance ... ,,29 He says it is "bizarre"
that most casebooks begin with a case about such a "truly trivial sub-
ject.""° Furthermore, whether Marbury actually received his commis-
sion, according to Professor Levinson, did not much interest Marbury
(he never sought to refile his case) and certainly will not interest first
year law students. Because "[m]any students look forward to taking
constitutional law because of their belief that the subject actually in-
volves important issues," teaching them Marbury right out of the gate
might alienate some of those students. '
When I teach Marbury, it becomes clear that the real "topic" of the
case has little to do with the original jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court, or for that matter with whether Marbury would get his com-
mission. Instead, the questions raised by Marbury include whether
the Supreme Court has the power to order the President to perform
a duty required by law and whether the Court must give effect to an
act of Congress that is inconsistent with the Constitution. John Mar-
shall dealt with both of these questions thoroughly, and his oft-cited
comments about the necessity of the rule of law and a government
that abides by the law are fundamentally important. My students
have little difficulty appreciating the importance of these discussions,
even though the actual result in the case might not interest them. As
Professor Weinberg writes, "[t] here can be little doubt that Marbury
was intended first and foremost to establish judicial control over the
government-over executive officials. 03




32 SeeFarber, supra note 14, at 415-16.
33 Louise Weinberg, Our Marbury, 89 VA. L. REV. 1235, 1404 (2003). In this brilliant new ar-
ticle, Professor Weinberg argues that the traditional critiques of Marbury are incorrect. For ex-
ample, as to section 13 of the firstJudiciary Act, she believes that Marshall was simply accepting
as true for purposes of argument Marbury's lawyer's hypothesis that section 13 granted the
Court original jurisdiction, and then Marshall said that, even so, the statute would be inconsis-
tent with Article III. In other words, Marshall did not really believe that section 13 applied to
the case but was willing to assume so consistent with the jurisdictional rules at the time. For this
Mar. 2004]
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Professor Levinson also suggests that Marbury is not worth teach-
ing because "it promotes an unjustified optimism in students that the
American constitutional system-including judicial decisions-has
happy endings, that it never serves as a mechanism for legitimizing
evil." 4 Though Marbuiy raises few moral questions, other early cases
dealing with slavery, like Prigg v. Pennsylvania,5 and Dred Scott v. San-
ford,-6 give students a better perspective on the Supreme Court and its
capacity for "rationalizing evil." Professor Levinson concludes that
the amount of time it would take to teach Marbuy successfully is not
justified because the case "teaches nothing at all about the capacity of
the law to enhance either good or evil."3
Professor Levinson is right that students should be exposed to
those many constitutional cases that arguably promote evil. But
whether that means discussing cases upholding the internment of
39~ . 4Japanese citizens, separate but equal" public accommodations, ° or
invalidating congressional efforts to end child labor,4' there is plenty
of time in the constitutional law course to expose students to consti-
tutional evil. That is not, however, where the course should start. In
fact, beginning with a case where the Court's relationships to the
other branches is discussed but where the stakes of the specific case
are not that important is pedagogically sound. Marbury is a good ve-
hicle to discuss constitutional interpretation "[precisely because] stu-
dents will rarely have a horse in any of Marbury's doc-
trinal/interpretative races[.]" 42 Marbuly gives students a chance to
express their views on judicial review before they see where it has led,
and those views may and usually do change over the course of the
semester, all of which makes for interesting and fruitful classroom
discussion.
and numerous other original and interesting observations about Marbury, Professor Weinberg's
article will be a "must read" for constitutional law scholars and teachers.
34 Levinson, supra note 1, at 561.
35 Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842) (striking down a Pennslyvania criminal
statute prohibiting the transportation or sale of slaves).
60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857) (invalidating the Missouri Compromise).
37 Levinson, supra note 1, at 562.
S8Id.
s9 SeeKorematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
40 SeePlessyv. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
41 See Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
42 See E-mail from Evan Caminker, Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School, to
Sanford Levinson, W. St. John Garwood & W. St. John Garwood, Jr. Centennial Chair in Law &
Professor of Government, University of Texas School of Law (Sept. 8, 2002), reprinted in Levin-
son, supra note 1, at 576-77.
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C. "Why Teach a Case That Is So Shoddy in Its Reasoning Unless One
Wants to Discredit the Enterprise of Legal Analysis? And Even if One
Does Want to Discredit the Enterprise of Legal Analysis, [Are] There
Not Better Cases than Marbury to Make the Poin?"
43
Professor Levinson states that one of the reasons he stopped
teaching Marbury was that he "got angry, every single year, when read-
ing Marshall's mangling of section 13 of the Judiciary Act and then
Article III of the Constitution."" These criticisms of Marbury are ex-
tensively discussed in the literature on Marbuy and Professor Levin-
son's indignation may be justified.45 Marshall appears to have mis-
construed section 13 of the Judiciary Act to authorize original
jurisdiction in the Supreme Court when the statute appears simply to
provide a remedy, and then only in appellate cases. 6 His apparent
reasons for doing so, to discuss the questions of judicial review of leg-
islation and the Court's power to order the Executive to obey the law,
are certainly strategic. As Professor Levinson points out, if a third-
year law student engaged in this kind of analysis, she would receive a
low grade.47 Furthermore, there are other significant problems with
Marshall's analysis, such as his incomplete theory as to Congress's
power to alter the original and appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court, and, as Professor Levinson argues brilliantly, Marshall's inde-
pendent interpretations of the statutory and constitutional question
48when the answers should inform each other.
Given these problems with Marshall's opinion, Professor Levinson
asks the following question: "Why should students' first experience
with constitutional analysis be a case that can be fully understood
only if one applies a fairly vulgar version of Legal Realism demon-
strating that a judge will do anything necessary to achieve his or her
policy goals?"49 Interestingly, Professor Levinson answers that ques-
tion himself. Marbury should be taught and emphasized because
"vulgar Legal Realism is correct."0 0 Although I would not put it quite
that way, if we look just at the subset of all cases that are constitu-
tional law cases decided by the Supreme Court, it should not be de-
batable that the Court is a political institution making political
decisions. To cite just a few of many examples, the Court in Bush v.
43 Levinson, supra note 1, at 562.
Id. at 562-63 (citation omitted).
45 The seminal piece is, of course, William W. Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v.
Madison, 1969 DUKE L.J. 1.
46 But see Weinberg, supra note 33, for an attack on this traditional critique.
47 See Levinson, supra note 1, at 564.
48 Id.
49 Id. at 566.
Id.
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Gore51 engaged in an attempt to write a decision with no precedential
value to achieve an overtly political result; the Court in Romer v. Ev-
ans 2 reached a decision arguably at odds with the only relevant
precedent without once discussing the dissent's reliance on that very
case; and in virtually all of the Court's Eleventh Amendment cases,
both the majority opinions and the dissents ignore clear constitu-
tional text to reach outcomes they prefer.3 And the list goes on and
on. In light of this reality, John Marshall's legal maneuverings in
Marbury are actually rather tame.
Professor Levinson also argues that, even if one believes that con-
stitutional law at the Supreme Court level is mostly politics, there are
better cases than Marbury to make that point. He cites Prigg' v. Penn-.54 5, -5
sylvania, Baker v. Carr, and Planned Parenthood v. Casey, among
other cases, as examples of more significant decisions that demon-
strate the connection between law and politics. 57 I agree that these
and numerous other cases make the point, but the reason to use
Marbury first is that in the very case where the Supreme Court first
embraced the idea of judicial review, the Court's decision sounds in
law and doctrine but is grounded in politics. Students should be ex-
posed to that contradiction, not to make them cynical, but to under-
stand the nature of the Court's decisionmaking in constitutional
cases. The Court does act politically and will continue to do so, and
students need to understand that reality. The beginning of that was
Marbuiy, for better or worse, and that is why the case is so important.
Professor Levinson further suggests that, if one accepts the Realist
critique, then one can do no more than express "simple political out-
rage concerning decisions they despise."5 8 How a Realist should teach
constitutional law is, indeed, a difficult question.59 But even a teacher
who truly accepts the Realist critique should teach students doctrine
because that is the language the Court speaks, not to mention the
51 531 U.S. 98 (2000); see also Levinson, supra note 1, at 566 (citing Bush v. Gore and the "zeal-
otry of the current Supreme Court majority with regard to protecting states against the
possibility of being sued by aggrieved citizens").
52 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
53 See, e.g., Eric J. Segall, Twenty Questions (Or the Hardest Course in Law School), 18 GA. ST. U.
L. REv. 497, 497 & n.3 (2001) (arguing that both the majority and dissenting opinions in Semi-
nole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996), ignore the clear text of the Eleventh Amendment).
54 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842) (striking down a Pennsylvania criminal statute prohibiting
the transportation or sale of slaves).
55 396 U.S. 186 (1962) (allowing legislative apportionment suits).
56 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (reaffirming key aspects of Roev. Wade, 411 U.S. 113 (1973)).
57 Levinson, supra note 1, at 566-67.
58 Id. at 568. He does not hold this view and believes there are opinions of the Court that
are "genuinely inspiring." Id. I think that a true or even a "vulgar" Legal Realist (like me) can
consistently believe that law is politics, and that there are cases that are truly inspiring.
59 See infra notes 76-79 and accompanying text for further discussion.
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need to prepare students for the bar examination. Lawyers in consti-
tutional cases have to argue in both the language of doctrine and the
reality of politics. Marbury was the first important constitutional law
case to use both vocabularies.
D. "Teaching Marbury Reinforces the Notion ofJudicial Supremacy
Instead of Constitutional Supremacy."6
Professor Levinson believes that "emphasizing Marbury reinforces
the single most pernicious aspect of American legal education,"
which is to identify the Constitution "with what the 'judges say it is."'
61
This view is not normatively acceptable, according to Professor Levin-
son, because it turns the Constitution into "the preserve of a re-
markably narrow professional elite."62 It is not descriptively correct
because a "far more plausible form of [legal] realism" is that the Con-
stitution is what a number of different institutional actors say it is, in-
cluding the other branches of government, bureaucrats, and local po-
lice.63
Professor Levinson's critique of judicial supremacy raises a variety
of difficult issues that are beyond the scope of this essay. His reliance
on that critique as a reason for not teaching Marbuiy, however, is not
persuasive because, as he concedes, "adherence to judicial-and not
merely constitutional-supremacy may not be the result of intrinsic
features of Marbuly. 64 In fact, there is little in Marbuy about judicial
65supremacy, though later cases such as Cooper v. Aaron' and United
States v. Nixon66 rely on Marbury for that proposition. A careful
teaching of the case will show how later Supreme Courts came to use
Marbury's language to stand for a proposition (judicial supremacy)
60 Levinson, supra note 1, at 569.
61 Id. at 569-70 (quoting THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN LEGAL QUOTATIONS 216
(Fred R. Shapiro ed., 1993) (quoting Charles Evans Hughes, Speech Before the Elmira Cham-
ber of Commerce (May 3, 1903), in ADDRESSES AND PAPERS OF CHARLES EVANS HUGHES:
GOVERNOR OF NEWYORK 1906-1908, at 133, 139 (1908))).
62 Id. at 570.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 358 U.S. 1 (1958) (finding that Arkansas was bound by the Court's decision in Brown v.
Board of Education because the "federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the Constitu-
tion."); id. at 18 (relying on Marbuyy).
418 U.S. 683, 703 (1974) (holding that President Nixon's claim of Executive Privilege was
reviewable by the Court because "'it is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial de-
partment to say what the law is'" (quoting Marbuiy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177)).
67 See Davison M. Douglas, The Rhetorical Uses ofMarbury v. Madison: The Emergence of a "Great
Case," 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 375, 409 (2003) ("In a number of cases, the Court has used Mar-
bury to justify the Court's assertion that its interpretations of the Constitution are supreme over
those of other governmental actors, a claim that Marshall did not make in his Marbury deci-
sion.").
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which it did not articulate. In fact, I cannot imagine how to fully dis-
cuss the question of judicial supremacy without giving students a
working knowledge of the case relied upon by the Court for that
claim. Additionally, to the extent there is some tension between the
existence of judicial review and the idea that the judiciary is not su-
preme, Marbuiy is an excellent, perhaps the best, vehicle for getting
at that problem. If it is the function of the 'Judiciary to say what the
law is" (and it is hard to see how an effective limited, constitutional
government could operate otherwise), then absent constitutional
amendment, it is arguable that the Court does have the final say.
Nonetheless, whether one accepts that or not, the terms of the debate
are in Marbuy; it was the first judicial articulation of the problem,
and it is still relied on by the Court in many of the highest stake cases.
For all of those reasons, students need a strong foundation in Marbury
to appreciate the debate over who has and/or should have the final
say on what the Constitution means.
Professor Levinson concludes his argument by suggesting that be-
ginning the constitutional law course with the history of the debate
over the constitutionality of the National Bank and then teaching
McCulloch v. Marylandf5 is preferable to starting with Marbury. He says
the following:
I am confident that every major issue of constitutional interpretation and
institutional power is instantiated in the forty-year-long debate about the
constitutionality of the Bank. Insofar as one of these issues is the role to
be played by the Court itself as constitutional interpreter, McCulloch of-
fers more than enough grist for whatever is one's particular mill. Marbury
69
adds nothing of genuine importance.
McCulloch is undeniably an important case that needs to be taught
to students comprehensively and with great care. But in that decision
Marshall assumes without discussion the Court's power to invalidate
state laws and there is little in the opinion about the Court's relation-
ship to the other branches of the national government." It is in Mar-
bury that Marshall talks about presidential powers and discretion, ju-
dicial review over acts of Congress, and the Supreme Court's role in71
relation to the other branches. It is logical to start with the Court's
granting itself the power of judicial review in Marbury, followed by a
68 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
69 Levinson, supra note 1, at 571-72.
70 SeeWeinberg, supra note 33, at 1347. Weinberg argues:
[McCulloch] tells us nothing about our constitutional rights or how to assert them. It
does not set up what courts do, and what the Supreme Court does. It does not establish
that the government must conform its conduct to the rule of law in American courts. It
is not part of what differentiates America from failed or oppressive countries. It is just
not Marbury.
Id.
7See sup ra notes 10-15 and accompanying text (discussing Marshall's opinion in Marbury).
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discussion of how the power also applies to the states by teaching
Martin v. Hunter's Lessee,72 and finally turning to McCulloch for an ex-
cellent discussion of how the Court should perform its interpretative
tasks. Moreover, by teaching both Marbury and McCulloch in detail, as
well as Gibbons v. Ogden5 and Wilson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co.,74 the
students can critique Marshall's decisions over time and also appreci-
ate his importance to the early development of constitutional law.
Nothing in this manner of teaching necessarily leads students to be-
lieve in judicial supremacy, and it is unfair to lay that charge at Mar-
bury's doorstep.
III. MARBURYJUDICIAL REVIEW, AND LEGAL REALISM
One of the most difficult aspects of teaching Marbury is exploring
with students the troubling aspects of the opinion without turning
them into constitutional law cynics at the very outset of the course.
Notice that I use the word "cynic," not "Realist." Marbury contains
important legal analysis which does not necessarily support the result
in the case, and the logic of which is not necessarily apparent. But
that is an accurate reflection of the semester (or two) to come. Al-
though it is beyond the scope of this Essay to support a full-fledged
Realist critique of constitutional law, it should now be well accepted
that the Court's constitutional cases are often decided with legal rea-
soning that is at best unpersuasive, and that in most cases prior doc-
trine could lead to either result. This is not necessarily bad, it is just
true. As Professor Balkin has eloquently said:
I must also confess that I find a certain kind of poetic justice in the fact
that at the very moment when the Supreme Court first announces the
doctrine of judicial review, at the very moment that.., symbolizes the
virtues of an independentjudiciary devoted to the Rule of Law, the Court
does so in a political context that demonstrates the Court's lack of inde-
pendence from politics.... To borrow a phrase from Freud, Marbury v.
Madison, the primal scene of American judicial review, is that tawdry mix-
ture of politics and law which dare not speak its name, and which must
always be denied by judges, but which has ever shaped the practice ofju-
dicial constitutional interpretation in our 
country.
72 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816) (holding that the Court has the power to review state court
determinations of federal law).
73 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824) (discussing Congress's commerce power and the dormant
Commerce Clause).
74 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245 (1829) (discussing the dormant Commerce Clause).
75 E-mail from Jack Balkin, Professor of Law, Yale Law School, to Sanford Levinson, W. St.
John Garwood & W. St.John Garwood, Jr. Centennial Chair in Law & Professor of Government,
University of Texas School of Law (Aug. 24, 2002), reprinted in Levinson, supra note 1, at 575-76.
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In order for the Constitution to actually limit the elected branches
and the states, there must be some kind of enforcement mechanism.
Even assuming the most "vulgar" form of Legal Realism in the sense
that the Court simply expresses political views for political reasons,
there are sound justifications for having a third governmental institu-
tion keep other institutional actors from violating our fundamental
law. And, this kind of system will work best when the enforcers are
politically independent and do not have to worry about being fired or
otherwise punished for unpopular decisions.76 The reason Marbuy is
so important is that it was the first and most important step in this
evolution. Congress could not be the ultimate interpreter "given a
written constitution dividing power among independent branches of
government."" The President's law-execution function, which has
turned into a lawmaking function, eliminates the Presidency for the
same reason. Furthermore, the idea of constitutional supremacy
without "some authoritative method of dispute resolution, would
wreak havoc."7 9 Accordingly, almost by default, but definitely starting
with Marbury, the Court has assumed that function.
Contrary to Professor Levinson's statements, even if one accepts
the most extreme Realist critique, that acceptance should not lead to
the failure to teach legal doctrine because doctrine plays an impor-
tant role in how lawyers argue cases and how judges explain their re-
sults. The hardest part of teaching constitutional law (perhaps any
law) is to give students a realistic account of the interplay between po-
litical preferences, political realities, and legal doctrine. Marbury
serves as an excellent example of those relationships. The political
context of the case is important (and interesting to students), Mar-
shall's political preferences are fairly easy to identify and explain (se-
cure a strong role for the Court while assuaging those who did not
want Marbury to get his commission), and his articulation of doctrine
is replete with unstated premises and obvious contradictions. All
three of those statements are also true of most of the cases students
are exposed to in constitutional law, and it is well worth emphasizing
that the way the modem Supreme Court handles issues of federalism,
due process, separation of powers, and individual rights, and just
about every other area of constitutional law, harkens back to the
structure and method of the Court's first real constitutional law
case-Marbury v. Madison.
76 Whether they should be appointed for life (rather than limited terms), however, is a very
different question.
77 Farber, supra note 14, at 415.
78 See id.
79 Id. at 415-16.
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CONCLUSION
There are two separate aspects to Marbury v. Madison. Professor
Levinson is correct that nothing very important hinged on whether
Marbury actually received his commission, and the issue of Congress's
power over the Court's original jurisdiction is unlikely to inspire our
students. The second aspect of Marbury, however, is that it analyzes
the circumstances under which the President is subservient to the
law, and justifies the Court's power of judicial review. For the first
time, the United States Supreme Court announced that the constitu-
tional and legal limitations on the elected branches would be en-
forced. This is government under law. We should not forget that, in
the end, John Marshall was correct. The Court did not have jurisdic-
tion over the case,judicial review of legislative acts is an indispensable
part of our system of checks and balances, and the President should
be amenable to suit when he violates vested legal rights. For these
contributions, Marbury deserves its status as a constitutional law clas-
sic, and its place at the beginning of any constitutional law syllabus.
